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ON THE UNEVEN JOURNEY TO CONSTITUTIONAL 
REDEMPTION:  THE MALAYSIAN JUDICIARY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
Yvonne Tew
†
Abstract: This article explores the Malaysian judiciary’s approach
toward interpreting the Federal Constitution of Malaysia and situates it within the context 
of the nation’s political and constitutional history. It traces the judiciary’s movement 
toward a more rights-oriented approach followed by its more recent retreat, which has 
been marked by strict formalism and insularity in several appellate court decisions. This 
article argues that the Malaysian courts’ journey toward constitutional redemption has 
been uneven so far. In order to reclaim its constitutional position as a co-equal branch of 
government, the Malaysian judiciary must be willing to uphold its constitutional duty to 
assert its commitment to constitutional supremacy and the rule of law.
I. INTRODUCTION
The story of the Malaysian judiciary is inextricably linked to the 
nation’s constitutional politics.  It is a tale of the judicial institution’s rise, 
fall, and ensuing struggle toward constitutional restoration.  Constitutional 
interpretation is, in large part, an underlying theme to this story: it is the 
means by which the judiciary articulates how it sees its role and molds its 
fate within the political climate that it finds itself.  This article explores the 
Malaysian courts’ approach toward interpreting Malaysia’s Federal 
Constitution and situates it within the context of the nation’s political and 
constitutional history. 
Since its independence in 1957, Malaysia has been governed by the 
same ruling coalition.  Judicial attitude toward constitutional adjudication 
must be understood against the backdrop of Malaysia’s dominant ruling 
party system.  For more than half a century, the Barisan Nasional ruling 
coalition has maintained control of the Malaysian federal government.  Until 
the 2008 general elections it had also controlled a two-thirds majority in 
Parliament, providing the government with the power to employ the 
constitutional amendment process to change most constitutional provisions.  
†
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Judicial attempts to challenge state power in the past have been rebuffed by 
legislative and constitutional amendments.
The face of Malaysian politics in the twenty-first century has begun to 
change.  For the first time in the nation’s history, Barisan Nasional lost its 
two-thirds legislative majority in the 2008 general elections.  Between 2011 
and 2012, Prime Minister Najib Razak took the unprecedented step of 
repealing the Internal Security Act, which had permitted preventive 
detention without trial, and lifted the emergency proclamations that had been 
in force over four decades.
1
Optimism over the Prime Minister’s reforms, 
however, was short-lived.  In the aftermath of the 2013 general elections—in 
which Barisan Nasional failed to regain its two-thirds legislative majority 
and, in addition, lost the popular vote—the government enacted several 
contentious new security laws.  Pushed through during controversial late 
night sessions of Parliament, these bills created new anti-terror legislation 
reviving detention without trial and a national security council law with 
enhanced powers for the executive, and also strengthened the existing 
sedition law.
2
Part II of this article sets the scene by providing an overview of 
Malaysia’s constitutional system and the operation of judicial review within 
its political context.  In Part III, I identify the prevailing strands in the 
judicial approach to constitutional interpretation.  I show how the Malaysian 
courts have generally adopted a strict literalism that is formalist and insular 
in its approach toward the interpretation of constitutional rights.  Part IV 
draws out recent developments and trends in the Malaysian courts’ 
constitutional adjudication.  I trace the judiciary’s shift toward a more 
purposive, rights-oriented approach followed by its more recent retreat, 
1
PM announces repeal of ISA, three Emergency proclamations, STAR (Sept. 15, 2011), 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/9/15/nation/20110915205714&sec=nation. For the full 
text of the Prime Minister’s speech, see Malaysia Day Message by Dato' Sri Mohd Najib bin Tun Haji 
Abdul Razak, Prime Minister of Malaysia, BADAN PEGUAM MALAYSIA [THE MALAYSIAN BAR] (Sept. 16, 
2011),  http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/legal/general_news/malaysia_day_message_by_dato_sri_mohd_ 
najib_bin_tun_haji_abdul_razak_prime_minister_of_malaysia.html.
2
See Thomas Fuller, Malaysia Revives Detention Without Trial With New Law, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/world/asia/malaysia-resurrects-detention-without-trial-
alarming-government-critics.html; Malaysia approves security law amid warning it could lead to 
dictatorship, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/04/malaysia-
approves-security-law-amid-warning-it-could-lead-to-dictatorship.
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which has been marked by its strict formalism in several 2015 and 2016 
appellate court decisions. The Malaysian courts’ journey toward 
constitutional redemption has, so far, been uneven at best.  In order for the 
Malaysian judiciary to restore its position as a co-equal branch of 
government, it will need to take firmer steps to assert its commitment to 
constitutional supremacy and its willingness to protect the fundamental 
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.  
II. SETTING THE SCENE: MALAYSIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL 
BACKDROP
A. Brief Overview of Malaysia’s Constitutional System
The Malaysian Constitution has its origins in the Merdeka
Constitution of 1957, which was conceived in the climate of a nation on the 
cusp of independence.
3
In 1824, the British began their colonialization in 
Malacca, which, along with Penang and Singapore, eventually became part 
of the Straits Settlements under British rule.  Nine Malay states—known as 
the Federated
4
and Unfederated Malay States
5
—would all come under 
indirect British rule as protectorates throughout the late nineteenth to the 
early twentieth century.  After the Second World War—during which 
Japanese forces occupied Malaya, Borneo, and Singapore—the British 
sought to unify Penang, Malacca, and the Malay States, leading to the 
Malayan Union being formed in 1946.  The Union was short-lived.  
Following outrage from the Malays at the British government’s “high-
handed” implementation of the Malayan Union,
6
it was replaced by the 
Federation of Malaya in 1948. 
Political development toward independence in the Federation of 
Malaya quickly gained momentum.  After an overwhelming victory in the 
1955 elections, the Alliance Party—a coalition made up of United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), 
and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC)—assumed power of the Federal 
3
Merdeka in Malay means “independence.” For more information, see generally Rais Yatim, The 
Road to Merdeka, in CONSTITUTIONAL LANDMARKS IN MALAYSIA: THE FIRST 50 YEARS 1957–2007 1
(Andrew Harding & H.P. Lee eds., 2007); ANDREW HARDING, THE CONSTITUTION OF MALAYSIA: A
CONTEXTUAL APPROACH (2012).
4
Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, and Selangor.
5
Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Terengganu.
6
HARDING, supra note 3, at 27.
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Legislative Council, with Tunku Abdul Rahman as the first Chief Minister.  
Negotiations in London led by Tunku Abdul Rahman took place between 
representatives of the British Government, the Government of Malaya, and 
the Malay Rulers.  The Conference resulted in the agreement to secure 
Malaya’s independence and to establish a Constitutional Commission to 
draft a new Constitution. 
On August 31, 1957, the Merdeka Constitution came into force when 
the Federation of Malaya became a fully independent state.  Six years later, 
on September 16, 1963, this 1957 Independence Constitution would become 
the Federal Constitution of Malaysia when Singapore and the Borneo states 
of Sabah and Sarawak joined the Federation to create the new nation of 
Malaysia. 
The Malaysian Constitution establishes a federal system of 
government with a bicameral legislature, federal executive, and judiciary.
7
Malaysia has a parliamentary system of government, where the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet are drawn from the majority party in Parliament, and 
the King—the Yang di-Pertuan Agong—is the constitutional head of the 
Federation.
8
Unlike the United Kingdom, however, Malaysia has a codified 
Constitution with a justiciable bill of rights.  The fundamental liberties are 
guaranteed in Part II of the Constitution, which include the right to life and 
personal liberty, freedom from slavery and forced labor, the right to equality, 
freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, and the right to 
property.
9
The courts’ power of judicial review over the constitutionality of 
legislation has been assumed as a natural corollary of the Malaysian 
Constitution’s supremacy clause.
10
The Federal Court of Malaysia is the 
nation’s apex appellate court.  It hears appeals from the Court of Appeal, and 
has exclusive jurisdiction over federalism issues, and disputes arising 
between the Federation and a state, or between individual states.
11
The other 
7
Federal Constitution, Arts. 39–65, 121–31.
8
Id. Arts. 32–37.
9
Id. Arts. 5–13.
10
Id. Art. 4(1) (“This Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation and any law . . . which is 
inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.”).
11
Id. Art. 128(1).
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appellate courts consist of two High Courts—one in Malaya and the other in 
Sabah and Sarawak.  The possibility of final appeal to the Privy Council was 
abolished in 1985, leaving the Federal Court as Malaysia’s court of final 
resort.  
Constitutional amendment requirements vary depending on the 
provision that is to be amended.
12
  The most common rule is that an 
amendment must be supported by two-thirds of the total membership of each 
House of Parliament.
13
  There are some exceptions to this rule.  
Amendments to citizenship, the Conference of Rulers, the Malay national 
language, and the special position of the Malays and the natives of Sabah 
and Sarawak require the consent of the Conference of Rulers in addition to 
the two-thirds parliamentary majority requirement.
14
Alterations to the 
provisions concerning the safeguards for the constitutional position of Sabah 
and Sarawak require the consent of the respective State Governments.
15
Some other amendments—like those altering supplementary citizenship 
provisions, admitting a new state into the Federation, or concerning oaths 
and affirmations—may be passed by a simple majority in Parliament.
16
In practice, the ruling coalition’s dominance of legislative seats has 
enabled the government to amend the Federal Constitution extensively.  
There have been approximately more than fifty amending acts and 700 
individual textual amendments made to the Malaysian Constitution since its 
enactment in 1957.
17
Until the 2008 general elections, when Barisan 
Nasional lost its two-thirds parliamentary majority for the first time since 
independence, the executive could—and did—employ the amendment 
process with ease and frequency to effect changes to the Malaysian 
Constitution.
18
12
Id. Art. 159.
13
Federal Constitution, Art. 159(3).
14
Id. Art. 159(5).  The Conference of Rulers is constituted of the Malay Rulers of individual states 
in Malaysia. Its primary function is to elect or remove the constitutional head of State in Malaysia, the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong.
15
Id. Art. 161E(2).
16
Id. Art. 159(1), (4).
17
Cindy Tham, Major Changes to the Constitution, THE SUN (July 17, 2007), 
http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/echoes_of_the_past/major_changes_to_the_constitution.html.
18
For example, following executive frustration with several judicial decisions that worked against 
the Malaysian Government’s interests in the 1980s, the Parliament amended Article 121(1) of the 
Constitution to remove the provision of “judicial power” being “vested” in the courts.  Instead, the new 
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B. Malaysian Courts and Constitutional Politics
Courts in Malaysia have the authority to review the constitutionality 
of legislative and executive actions.  Judges are empowered under the 
Malaysian Constitution to declare laws invalid for constitutional rights 
violations.  The Article 4 supremacy clause states that the Constitution is 
regarded as the supreme law and that any law inconsistent with the 
Constitution is void.
19
In Malaysia, the power of judicial review over the 
constitutionality of legislation established by the United States Supreme 
Court in Marbury v. Madison is assumed.
20
Unlike its United Kingdom 
counterpart, courts in Malaysia are not subordinate to a supreme Parliament, 
and thus have the power to strike down legislation for rights violations.  In 
practice, however, the Malaysian courts have been far from robust in 
protecting constitutional rights through the exercise of judicial review, 
resulting in a system of de facto legislative supremacy.
Constitutional adjudication in Malaysia needs to be understood in the 
context of its dominant ruling party system.  The influence of a Westminster 
system of government, with a bicameral Parliament closely fused with the 
Cabinet, has meant that the executive and legislature maintain a strong 
control over government power.
21
The Barisan Nasional ruling coalition 
has been in power since independence, and until the 2008 elections in 
Malaysia, with a supermajority in Parliament.
The foundations of the judicial institution were severely shaken 
during the constitutional crisis of 1988 in Malaysia, an episode that involved 
an intense confrontation between the judiciary and the executive.
22
Following several Supreme Court decisions that incurred the frustration of 
provision now states that the courts “shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or 
under federal law.”  See Federal Constitution, Art. 121(1).
19
Federal Constitution, Art. 4(1) (“This Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation and any 
law . . . which is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.”). The 
drafters of the Merdeka Constitution clearly intended the Supreme Court to have the power to protect 
individual rights by having the final interpretation of the Constitution. See JOSEPH M. FERNANDO, THE 
MAKING OF THE MALAYAN CONSTITUTION 92 (2002).
20
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
21
See JOSEPH M. FERNANDO, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MALAYSIA AND 
THE UNITED STATES 37 (2007).
22
See Visu Sinnadurai, The 1988 Judiciary Crisis and its Aftermath, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
LANDMARKS IN MALAYSIA, supra note 3, at 173. 
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the administration, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad advised the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong that the Lord President of the Malaysian Supreme Court 
should be removed on grounds of misbehavior.
23
Despite several objections 
against, the Tribunal convened to investigate the alleged misbehavior, 
including that the Tribunal was chaired by the judge who would benefit by 
succeeding the Lord President if he was dismissed, the Lord President was 
eventually controversially removed from office.  This unprecedented 
removal of the Lord President, along with two other Supreme Court judges, 
is widely considered one of the lowest points in Malaysian constitutional 
history.
24
The 1988 judicial crisis caused a tremendous blow to the 
Malaysian judiciary’s institutional integrity and the public’s confidence in 
the country’s legal system and political institutions. 
The political reality in Malaysia is that external constraints 
undoubtedly color the courts’ exercise of judicial review.  Consider, as 
another example, the government’s move to curtail judicial power through 
constitutional amendment.  In 1988, the Malaysian Supreme Court in Dato 
Yap Peng v. Public Prosecutor struck down a statutory provision which 
allowed the Attorney General to withdraw criminal cases before a lower 
court as a violation of the constitutional provision that vests judicial power 
solely in the courts.
25
The provision was a “legislative incursion to facilitate 
executive incursion” and, as Supreme Court Justice Eusoffe Abdoolcader 
observed, was “both a legislative and executive intromission into the judicial 
power of the Federation” vested in the courts under Article 121.
26
  The 
Malaysian Government responded by amending the Constitution to remove 
the reference to judicial power being “vested” in the courts.
27
Article 121(1) 
23
The Lord President of the Supreme Court is the equivalent of the Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court. 
24
See, e.g., HARDING, supra note 3, at 216 (noting that the Malaysian Bar and many commentators 
consider the 1988 judicial crisis a “watershed” in Malaysian constitutional history following which “both 
the appearance and reality of judicial autonomy were compromised”).
25
Dato Yap Peng. v. Public Prosecutor [1988] 1 M.L.J. 119.
26
Id. at 318.
27
Federal Constitution, Art. 121(1) (“[T]he judicial power of the Federation shall be vested in two 
High Courts of coordinate jurisdiction and status . . . and in such inferior courts as may be provided for by 
federal law.”) (before amendment).
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now simply provides that the courts “shall have such jurisdiction and powers 
as may be conferred by or under federal law.”
28
Public confidence in the independence of the Malaysian judiciary 
continued to erode throughout the 1990s and 2000s.  Several episodes 
compounded the perception of the judiciary’s downward slide post-1988.  In 
2007, for example, controversy erupted over an exposed videotaped 
conversation from 2002 that showed lawyer V.K. Lingam speaking on the 
phone with someone suspected to be Ahmad Fairuz, at the time the Chief 
Judge of the High Court of Malaya and later the Chief Justice of Malaysia.
29
The conversation allegedly involved discussions regarding fixing the 
appointment of senior judges and also suggested that a senior judge had been 
politically motivated in deciding a case against an Opposition MP. 
The Malaysian Bar Council and civil society activists were vocal in 
criticizing these issues and calling for reforms.
30
In response, the 
Government eventually set up a Royal Commission of Inquiry, whose report 
in May 2008 found the Lingam videotape was authentic and that it provided 
evidence for concern regarding political involvement in judicial 
appointments.
31
The Government adopted the Commission’s 
recommendation to establish a Judicial Appointments Commission, but no 
action was taken against any of the individuals implicated in the Lingam 
affair. 
Despite the establishment of the Judicial Appointments Commission 
in 2009, concerns persist regarding the judicial appointments process in 
Malaysia.  In 2015, retired Court of Appeal Judge Hishamuddin Yunus 
noted in a public interview that he had been bypassed for a promotion to the 
28
Id. Art. 121(1) (“There shall be two High Courts . . . and such inferior courts as may be provided 
by federal law; and the High Courts and inferior courts shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be 
conferred by or under federal law.”) (as amended by the Constitutional (Amendment) Act 1988).
29
Special Report: The Lingam Tape, MALAYSIAKINI (Sept. 24, 2007), http://www.malaysiakini.com/
news/72772.
30
See Jalil Hamad, Malaysia lawyers hold rare demonstration for reform, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2007), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-judiciary-idUSKLR19425220070926.  See generally Andrew 
Harding & Amanda Whiting, Custodian of Civil Liberties and Justice in Malaysia: The Malaysian Bar and 
the Moderate State, in FORTUNES AND MISFORTUNES OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM (T.C. Halliday, et al. eds., 
2011).
31
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY ON THE VIDEO CLIP RECORDING OF IMAGES OF A 
PERSON PURPORTED TO BE AN ADVOCATE AND SOLICITOR, ETC. (May 9, 2008).
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Federal Court due to Prime Minister Najib Razak’s disagreement with the 
Commission’s recommendation to appoint him to the apex court.
32
While institutional reforms of the judiciary are no doubt important, 
such external reforms like the Judicial Appointments Commission need to be 
accompanied by a shift in the judiciary’s own internal approach in order for 
the Malaysian courts to affirmatively regain its role as an independent 
branch of government committed to the rule of law.
III. INTERPRETING THE MALAYSIAN CONSTITUTION 
A. The “Four Walls” of the Constitution 
Courts in Malaysia strongly emphasize an inward-looking approach to 
interpreting the Malaysian Constitution, an exercise conducted “within its 
own four walls.”
33
Judges operating under this principle refuse to engage 
with sources from comparative jurisdictions or international law principles, 
viewing such influences as irrelevant to the task of interpreting Malaysia’s 
domestic Constitution. 
Half a century ago, the Malaysian Supreme Court articulated the “four 
walls” approach in Government of Kelantan v. Government of the 
Federation of Malaya.
34
“The Constitution is primarily to be interpreted 
within its own four walls and not in the light of analogies drawn from other 
countries such as Great Britain, the United States of America or Australia,” 
wrote the Court.
35
In 1987, the Supreme Court in Attorney General v. 
Arthur Lee Meng Kuang likewise declared that having regard for local 
conditions meant that “criticisms which are considered as within the limit of 
reasonable courtesy elsewhere are not necessarily so here.”
36
The “four walls” doctrine remains alive and well in practice in 
contemporary Malaysian constitutional adjudication.  In 2016, the Malaysian 
32
Ex-appellate judge Hishamudin says hit glass ceiling because didn’t get PM’s nod, MALAY MAIL 
ONLINE (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/ex-appellate-judge-
hishamudin-says-hit-glass-ceiling-because-didnt-get-pms.
33
Government of the State of Kelantan v. Government of the Federation of Malayaa and Tunku 
Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj [1963] 29 M.L.J. 355.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 369.
36
Attorney General v. Arthur Lee Meng Kuang [1987] 1 M.L.J. 207, 209.
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Court of Appeal illustrated its use in Indira Gandhi.
37
At stake in this case 
was the issue of whether a parent could unilaterally convert a child to Islam 
without the knowledge or consent of the other parent.  Indira Gandhi’s ex-
husband had converted from being Hindu to Muslim.  Without her 
knowledge, he then converted all their three children to Islam and obtained 
custody over the children from the Sharia court—a religious court which 
Indira Gandhi could not access as a non-Muslim.  Indira Gandhi brought her 
case to the civil courts, arguing against the children’s conversion and asking 
for custody.
The High Court held in favor of Indira Gandhi, quashing the 
children’s conversion certificates by the Sharia Court and awarding Indira 
Gandhi custody.
38
The lower appellate court reasoned that the Article 12(4) 
constitutional provision, which specifies that a minor’s religion “shall be 
decided by his parent or guardian,” should be read in line with the Article 8 
guarantee of equal protection to guarantee both parents an equal right to 
determine the religion of their child.
39
As such, a child of a civil law 
marriage could not be converted to Islam unilaterally by one parent without 
the consent of the other non-converting parent.  Justice Lee Swee Seng 
further stated that “as a member of the international community, Malaysia 
cannot ignore our commitment to various conventions that we have adopted 
and indeed we have amended our laws to more clearly reflect our 
commitments.”
40
The Court of Appeal, however, rejected the lower court’s approach 
and ruled against Indira Gandhi.
41
  The majority opinion held that the Sharia 
court had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any conversion 
37
Pathmanathan a/l Krishnan v. Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho Civil Appeals No A-02-1826-08/2013 
(Dec. 30, 2015) (Court of Appeal) [hereinafter Indira Gandhi (CA)]. 
38
Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak [2013] 5 M.L.J. 552
[hereinafter Indira Gandhi (HC)]. 
39
See id. at para 15.  See also Federal Constitution, Art. 12(4) (“For the purposes of Clause (3) the 
religion of a person under the age of eighteen years shall be decided by his parent or guardian.”); Federal 
Constitution, Art. 8(1) (“All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the 
law.”).
40
Indira Gandhi (HC), supra note 38, at para. 62. According to the High Court, this interpretation 
would be in line with Malaysia’s commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
the Convention on Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).  See id. at paras. 62–76.
41
Indira Gandhi (CA), supra note 37 at para. 33. 
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to Islam.
42
The Court of Appeal’s majority rebuked the lower court for 
considering Malaysia’s commitments under international law, declaring that 
judges “should not use international norms as a guide to interpret our 
Federal Constitution.”
43
Such norms were merely statements of principle 
“devoid of any obligatory character” and “not part of [domestic Malaysian] 
law.”
44
According to the Court of Appeal, the court was not free “to stretch or 
pervert the language of the Constitution in the interest of any legal of 
constitutional theory” nor to decide whether a legislative act is “in 
contravention of generally acknowledged principles of international law.”
45
It concluded by observing that the approach taken by the lower High Court 
of “sticking very closely to the standard of international norms in 
interpreting the Federal Constitution is not in tandem with the accepted 
principles of constitutional interpretation.”
46
This employment of the “four walls” approach, however, is unduly 
insular.  The Supreme Court asserted in Loh Kooi Choon v. Government of 
Malaysia that “in the end it is the wording of our Constitution itself that is to 
be interpreted and applied, and this wording can never be overridden by 
extraneous principles of other Constitutions.
”47
But this is surely axiomatic.  
Looking beyond the “four walls” of the Constitution need not entail the 
overriding of domestic constitutional provisions by external constitutional 
sources.  The starting point of any constitutional interpretation approach is 
of course its own constitution. 
None of this means, though, that Malaysian courts should refuse to 
engage with the experiences of other constitutional systems.  Even in Loh 
Kooi Choon, the Supreme Court acknowledges that: “We look at other 
Constitutions to learn from their experiences, and from a desire to see how 
their progress and well-being is ensured by their fundamental law.”
48
Rigidly applying the “four walls” doctrine simply binds courts to the 
42
Id.
43
Id. at para. 66 (citing Public Prosecutor v. Kok Wah Kuan [2007] 6 C.L.J. 341, 355).
44
Id. at para. 65 (citing Merdeka University Berhad v. Government of Malaysia [1981] C.L.J. (REP)
191, 209).
45
Id. at para. 69.
46
Id. at para. 71.
47
Loh Kooi Choon v. Government of Malaysia [1997] 2 M.L.J. 187, 188–89.
48
Id.
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“austerity of tabulated legalism,” which the Privy Council denounced in 
Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher as an inappropriate means of interpreting 
a Westminster model constitution.
49
In Fisher, the Privy Council 
emphasized that the relevant approach to constitutional interpretation for 
constitutions based on the Westminster model called for a “generous 
interpretation” to give individuals the “full measure” of fundamental rights 
and freedoms.
50
B. Strict Literalism and Formalism
Malaysian courts have generally been extremely formalist and legalist 
in interpreting constitutional rights provisions.  Judges tend to employ a 
strict legalism toward constitutional interpretation.  The Federal Court of 
Malaysia, in particular, has predominantly relied on a literalist and formalist 
approach in interpreting constitutional rights guarantees. 
Consider, for example, the Federal Court’s approach to the right to 
equality in the case of Danaharta Urus v. Kekatong.
51
A statute provided 
that the courts could not make any order that would stay, restrain, or affect 
any action taken by Danaharta, the nation’s asset management company.  
The Court of Appeal had held that this provision violated the constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection of the law, finding access to justice—a
fundamental principle of natural justice—an integral part of the right to 
equality.
52
Propounding a generous approach to the interpretation of “the 
fundamental liberties guaranteed by Part II,” the Court of Appeal asserted 
that the rights “should receive a broad, liberal and purposive construction.”
53
The Federal Court disagreed, unanimously overruling the Court of 
Appeal’s decision.
54
Adopting a formalistic approach toward the right of 
equality, Justice Augustine Paul declared: “the manner and the extent of the 
49
Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [1980] AC 319, 328.
50
Id. at 328.
51
See Danaharta Urus v. Kekatong [2004] 2 M.L.J. 257; Federal Constitution, Art. 8(1) (“All 
persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.”).
52
See Kekatong Sdn Bhd v. Danaharta Urus Berhand [2003] 3 M.L.J. 1.
53
Id. at para. 48.
54
Danaharta Urus v. Kekatong [2004] 2 M.L.J. 257.
JUNE 2016 The Malaysian Judiciary and Constitutional Politics 685
exercise of the right to access to justice is subject to and circumscribed by 
the jurisdiction and powers of the court as provided by federal law.”
55
In a similar vein, the Federal Court rejected the High Court’s 
endorsement of a rights-oriented approach to interpretation in Tan Boon 
Wah v. Datuk Seri Ahmad Said Hamdan.
56
This case was brought following 
the controversial death of Teoh Beng Hock while in the custody of the 
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC).  In considering whether 
the MACC Act’s provision for “day-to-day” questioning allowed the 
Commission to interrogate witnesses continuously beyond normal working 
hours, the High Court held that such prolonged questioning violated the 
Article 5 right of protection for personal liberty.
57
With regard to 
interpreting legislation affecting fundamental liberties, the High Court 
declared, “[t]here should be less room for literalism, but greater scope for a 
rights-oriented approach to interpretation.”
58
The High Court’s approach was rejected by both the Court of Appeal 
and the Federal Court.  The Court of Appeal adopted a literalist 
interpretation of the MACC Act that “day-to-day” questioning allowed 
witnesses to be continuously interrogated beyond regular working hours.
59
In stark contrast to the High Court’s rights-oriented approach, the Court of 
Appeal emphasized “the importance of giving effect to the plain words in a 
legislation.”
60
The Federal Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision, 
dismissing an appeal against the intermediate appellate court’s ruling.
61
Yet, for a while, there appeared to be indications of a shift in judicial 
attitudes away from strict literalism toward a more generous, purposive 
constitutional interpretation approach.  Consider, for example, the 2010 case 
of Sivarasa Rasiah v. Badan Peguam Malaysia.
62
In this landmark decision, 
the Federal Court held that restrictions on the Article 10 right to freedom of 
association had to be both reasonable and proportionate, reasoning that 
55
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“restrictions that limit or derogate from guaranteed rights must be read 
restrictively.”
63
Strikingly, the apex court endorsed “a prismatic approach to 
interpretation,” exhorting that “the provisions of the Constitution, in 
particular the fundamental liberties guaranteed under Part II, must be 
generously interpreted….”
64
Another significant decision was delivered four years later by the 
Court of Appeal in the 2014 case of Nik Nazmi bin Nik Ahmad v. Public 
Prosecutor.
65
The case involved section 9(1) and 9(5) of the Peaceful
Assembly Act, which imposed criminal sanctions on organizers of public 
assemblies for failure to notify the police at least ten days before the date of 
the assembly.
66
The Court of Appeal struck down the provision as an 
unreasonable restriction on the constitutional right to freedom of assembly 
guaranteed under Article 10.  Ruling that Article 10 must be read “in 
conformity with the general jurisprudence relating to reasonableness and 
proportionality,”
67
the court held that the section 9(5) failed the 
reasonableness test as well as the proportionality test as it has no nexus to 
public order, national security or a non-peaceful assembly.
68
As the Court of 
Appeal declared, the court had a “constitutional duty…to ensure that 
enshrined freedom is not violated by retrogressive legislation…without 
meaningful grounds consistent with the Federal Constitution.”
69
These decisions by the Federal Court and Court of Appeal in Sivarasa 
and Nik Nazmi seemed to inaugurate a departure from the appellate courts’ 
excessively restrictive and formalist approach to constitutional rights 
adjudication.
More recent decisions, however, appear to signal a significant retreat 
from this emerging trend toward a more expansive approach to rights 
adjudication.  In Public Prosecutor v. Yuneswaran, the courts were again 
tasked with considering the constitutionality of the Peaceful Assembly Act.
70
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Yuneswaran Ramaraj, the organizer of a rally, was charged with failing to 
give adequate notice to the police in advance of the event.  The High Court 
acquitted Yuneswaran,
71
relying on the Court of Appeal’s earlier Nik Nazmi
ruling that section 9(1) and 9(5) of the Peaceful Assembly Act were 
unconstitutional infringements of the right to freedom of assembly.
72
The 
Federal Court dismissed an application for the court to determine the issue, 
citing jurisdictional grounds, leaving the prosecution’s appeal to be decided 
by the Court of Appeal.
73
In a stark departure from its earlier decision in Nik Nazmi, the Court
of Appeal in October 2015 held that the Peaceful Assembly Act provisions 
were valid and did not violate Article 10 of the Constitution.  The 
intermediate appellate court refused to follow the Federal Court’s approach 
in Sivarasa,
74
which had established that restrictions on freedom of 
assembly had to be “reasonable.”
75
Instead, the Court of Appeal declared 
that “[t]he correct approach is to look at the legislative competency of 
Parliament,” signaling a return to a strict legalist and literalist approach.
76
“The Courts in this country do not comment on the quality of a law,” wrote 
the Court of Appeal, “that is to say, the Courts do not consider it any part of 
its judicial function to paint any law as ‘reasonable’ or ‘unreasonable’ or 
‘harsh’ or ‘unjust’ . . . .”
77
In addition, the Court of Appeal adopted an originalist stance to 
justify its position that Article 10 did not contain an implied 
“reasonableness” qualification on its restriction.  The court relied heavily on 
the legislative history of Article 10, reasoning that “the non-inclusion of the 
word ‘reasonable’ in Article 10 was not some oversight on the part of the 
Reid Commission.”
78
Rather, it was a “deliberate decision” on the part of 
the framers to leave the judgment of what was reasonable to Parliament, not 
71
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the courts.
79
Although the Court of Appeal acknowledged that “the words 
used or not used by the framers of our Constitution are not etched in stone,” 
it reasoned that amending the Constitution is “surely…a task for 
Parliament.”
80
The court concluded that: “To allow the Court to reinstate 
the word reasonable would be tantamount to the Courts amending the 
Federal Constitution against the decision of the framers of our Constitution, 
in fact usurping the powers of the Parliament.”
On October 6, 2015, several days after the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment in Yuneswaran, the Federal Court delivered its decision in Public 
Prosecutor v. Azmi Sharom.
81
The case involved a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the 1948 Sedition Act.
82
This challenge was brought by 
law professor Azmi Sharom, who had been charged under the Sedition Act 
for stating his opinion regarding the legality of an aspect of the 2009 Perak 
constitutional crisis.
The Federal Court unanimously upheld the Sedition Act as 
constitutional, ruling that the law did not infringe upon the Article 10 right 
to freedom of expression.  The Court explicitly departed from the 
reasonableness test articulated by the Federal Court in its earlier 2010 
decision in Sivarasa.
83
Chief Justice Arifin Zakaria, writing for the Court, 
observed—as the Court of Appeal did in Yuneswaran—that the word 
“reasonable” as a qualification to restrictions on freedom of speech in 
Article 10 was omitted from the final draft of the Constitution by its 
framers.
84
“For this reason,” asserted the Chief Justice, “it is not for the 
Court to determine whether the restriction imposed by the legislature 
pursuant to Art. 10(2) is reasonable or otherwise.”
85
To do so, would 
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amount to the Court “rewriting the provisions of Art. 10(2)” of the 
Constitution.
86
The Court, however, seemed to accept the use of proportionality—the 
other test established in Sivarasa—in determining the validity of a law.
87
Yet despite quoting the proportionality test employed by the Privy Council 
in a 1998 decision, the Federal Court did not appear to apply the structured 
analysis of this proportionality test in its own opinion.
88
According to the 
Federal Court, the Sedition Act’s provision “is directed to any act, word, or 
publication having a ‘seditious tendency’….”  Offering little analysis for its 
conclusion, it immediately goes on to hold: “This in our view is consistent 
with . . . the Constitution, as it cannot be said that the restrictions imposed 
[by the Sedition Act] is too remote or not sufficiently connected to the 
subjects/objects enumerated in Art.10(2)(a).”
89
The Chief Justice’s opinion 
does not subject the breadth of the legislation’s definition of acts with a 
“seditious tendency” to any analysis of whether the measure is proportionate 
by being no more restrictive than necessary, beyond observing that the Act 
provides for a number of exceptions.
90
It concludes that the restrictions on 
fundamental rights imposed by the Sedition Act “fall[s] squarely within the 
ambit…of the Constitution.”
91
It is striking that the Federal Court expressly rejected the 
“reasonableness” standard but accepted proportionality, which is considered 
in most common law jurisdictions to be a more stringent standard of review 
than reasonableness.
92
The proportionality review exercised by the Court in 
this case, though, appears far from rigorous.  Applied in this perfunctory 
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manner, the adoption of proportionality is unlikely to exercise any 
meaningful review over government intrusions on constitutional rights.  
C. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: A “Basic Structure” 
Doctrine?
The Malaysian courts have traditionally been skeptical of the basic 
structure doctrine articulated by the Indian Supreme Court in Kesavananda 
v. State of Kerala, which stipulates that a law seeking to amend the 
Constitution is invalid if it would destroy the Constitution’s basic 
structure.
93
The applicability of the “basic structure” doctrine to the 
Malaysian Constitution has been considered by the Supreme Court in several 
cases.  In the 1977 case of Loh Kooi Choon v. Government of Malaysia,
94
Raja Azlan Shah declined to adopt a notion of a “doctrine of implied 
restrictions on the power of constitutional amendment,” stating that “it 
concedes to the court a more potent power of constitutional amendment 
through judicial legislation than the organ formally and clearly chosen by the 
Constitution for the exercise of the amending power.”
95
  And in Phang Chin 
Hock v Public Prosecutor,
96
the Supreme Court in 1988 observed that “it is 
enough for us merely to say that Parliament may amend the Constitution in 
the way they think fit, provided they comply with all the conditions 
precedent and subsequent regarding manner and form prescribed by the 
Constitution itself.”
97
Strikingly, however, in the 2010 case of Sivarasa Rasiah v. Badan 
Peguam Malaysia,
98
Malaysia’s highest appellate court declared that 
“Parliament cannot enact laws (including Acts amending the Constitution) 
that violate the basic structure.”
99
In considering the Supreme Court’s 
earlier decision in Loh Kooi Choon, the Federal Court called the Supreme 
Court’s reliance on the English decision of Vacher v. London Society of 
93
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Compositors
100
“misplaced.”
101
According to Justice Gopal Sri Ram, writing 
for the Federal Court in Sivarasa, the Vacher endorsement of the view that 
courts should interpret and not pronounce on the policy of legislation had 
been made “in the context of a country whose Parliament is supreme.”
102
Unlike the UK, the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy does not apply in 
Malaysia, which has a written constitution.
103
According to the Federal 
Court, the “fundamental rights guaranteed under [the Constitution] is part of 
the basic structure of the Constitution.”
104
The Federal Court’s endorsement of the basic structure doctrine in 
Sivarasa opened up new prospects for Malaysian courts to adopt a bolder 
approach toward reviewing the validity of legislative actions.  In 2011, the 
Court of Appeal in Muhammad Hilman bin Idham relied on Sivarasa to 
invalidate a legislative provision that it held to be an unreasonable restriction 
on the freedom of expression.
105
  Justice Mohamad Hishamuddin Yunus 
underscored that the Federal Court in Sivarasa had given “recognition for 
the first time, albeit in a limited fashion, to the doctrine of basic structure of 
the Constitution.”
106
The Court of Appeal in Yuneswaran v. Public Prosecutor in 2015, 
though, refused to follow the approach of the Federal Court in Sivarasa.
107
Although there was no explicit reference to the basic structure doctrine in 
Yuneswaran, the Court of Appeal refused to follow the Federal Court’s 
determination in Sivarasa that restrictions on guaranteed constitutional 
rights had to be “reasonable” in considering a potential infringement to 
Article 10.  The Court of Appeal disavowed the Federal Court’s statements 
in Sivarasa as “merely obiter”—and, moreover, held that the dicta should 
not be followed—indicating a mixed reception among the Malaysian 
appellate courts to the approach articulated in Sivarasa.
108
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IV. THE UNEVEN JOURNEY TO CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION
Since the 1988 judicial crisis, the Malaysian judiciary has struggled to 
regain the public’s confidence in the nation’s constitutional system.  In the 
period following that dark period in Malaysia’s constitutional history, the 
concentration of extensive powers in the political branches has been 
unimpeded by the judiciary’s deferential attitude to the executive and 
legislature.  Judicial reluctance to exercise review over constitutional rights 
infringements has been characterized by its strict literalist and formalist 
approach toward constitutional interpretation within the “four walls” of the 
Constitution. 
Yet, in recent years, there have been indications of a movement in 
several judicial decisions toward a greater willingness to exercise more 
robust protection of constitutional rights.  Take, for instance, the Federal 
Court’s exhortation in Sivarasa Rasiah in 2010 for courts to adopt a 
“prismatic approach to interpretation” that would support a generous 
approach toward the interpretation of fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution.  In addition, the apex court also explicitly endorsed the notion 
that Parliament cannot enact laws to amend the Constitution that would 
violate its basic structure.
109
The Court of Appeal in its 2011 and 2014 decisions in Muhammad 
Hilman bin Idham
110
and Nik Nazmi bin Nik Ahmad
111
relied on the 
approach articulated in Sivarasa to strike down laws as unconstitutional 
violations of the Article 10 right to freedom of assembly. In Muhammad 
Hilman, the appellate court declared Section 15(5) of the Universities and 
University Colleges Act 1971—which prevented students from “expressing 
support for or sympathy with or opposition to any political party”—invalid 
for unreasonably restricting the students’ freedom of expression.
112
Three 
years later, the Court of Appeal in Nik Nazmi struck down the notification 
requirement for organizers of public assembles in Section 9(5) of the 
109
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Peaceful Assembly Act for infringing Article 10.
113
The Malaysian judiciary 
appeared to have taken clear steps toward constitutional restoration. 
Several recent appellate court decisions, however, have shown a 
retreat from this trend.  For instance, the Court of Appeal backtracked from 
its rights-oriented approach in its 2015 Yuneswaran decision.  Taking an 
entirely conflicting approach from its earlier decision in Nik Nazmi, the 
Court of Appeal concluded that Section 9(5) of the Peaceful Assembly Act 
was constitutionally valid and enforceable.  Moreover, the court disavowed 
Sivarasa as dicta that should not be followed, rejecting the Federal Court’s 
establishment of a reasonableness requirement for restrictions on the right to 
freedom of assembly.
The battle over the spirit of the judiciary’s approach toward 
constitutional rights protection continues.  The High Court’s 2013 ground-
breaking decision in 2013, which held that unilateral conversion of a child to 
Islam would infringe the other parent’s right of equality and religious 
freedom, was short-lived.
114
In January 2016, the Court of Appeal overruled 
the lower appellate court, repudiating the High Court for paying attention to 
international norms in considering how to interpret the rights under the 
Constitution in line with Malaysia’s commitments under international 
conventions.
115
Using strict literalist and formalist reasoning, the Court of 
Appeal stressed that the court was not free “to stretch or pervert the language 
of the Constitution.”
116
This pattern of the Malaysian Federal Court overruling bolder, more 
rights-expansive judgments rendered by the High Court recurs elsewhere.  In 
2013, the Court of Appeal unanimously overturned the High Court’s 
decision that a government order prohibiting a Catholic publication from 
using the word “Allah” violated the Catholic Church’s right to religious 
113
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freedom.
117
The Federal Court dismissed the Catholic Church’s application 
for leave to appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal had applied the correct 
test.
118
This tendency to find that laws passed by a religious state authority do 
not infringe basic rights is further demonstrated by the 2015 case of ZI 
Publications Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor unanimously 
dismissed an application to nullify a Selangor Sharia legislation that made it 
a criminal offence for Muslims to publish books that the state religious 
authority deemed to be against “Islamic law.”
119
The Court concluded that 
the state law did not infringe freedom of expression or religious liberty as 
these rights had to be interpreted restrictively in light of the constitutional 
provision declaring Islam as the religion of the Federation of Malaysia.
120
Another recent case involved a challenge to a Sharia law that made it 
an offence for any Muslim male to dress in women’s attire brought by three 
transgender applicants.  The Court of Appeal’s 2014 decision that the state’s 
Sharia law was void as it unconstitutionally infringed several constitutional 
rights provided a fleeting victory for the transgender community.
121
In 2015, 
the Federal Court overturned the Court of Appeal’s decision on procedural 
grounds, in effect allowing the state ban to remain valid.
122
V. CONCLUSION
Under Malaysia’s Federal Constitution, courts are empowered to 
invalidate legislative and executive action for rights infringements.  Yet the 
Malaysian judiciary has been far from vigorous in protecting the rights 
117
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guaranteed in the Constitution.  The prevailing judicial stance has been to 
adhere to a strict legalist and literalist approach, marked by insularity and an 
unwillingness to contemplate fundamental underlying principles.  The courts 
have tended to defer extensively to the political branches exercising little 
meaningful review over government intrusions on fundamental liberties.
Constitutional politics have clearly played a role.  Despite 
constitutional supremacy being the acknowledged framework of the 
Malaysian legal system, the dominance of the ruling coalition government 
has contributed to a situation of de facto legislative—and executive—
supremacy.  For much of the nation’s history since independence, the ruling 
coalition’s control of more than two-thirds of the legislature has enabled the 
government in the past to amend the Constitution with ease, weakening 
constitutional safeguards.  Aggressive rebuffs to judicial challenges through 
legislative or constitutional amendments have contributed to the courts’ 
reluctance to exercise robust review over the powerful political branches. 
Over the first two decades of the twenty-first century, however, the 
dominance of Malaysia’s ruling government has increasingly been 
challenged.  In the 2008 general elections, the Barisan Nasional coalition 
lost its two-thirds legislative majority for the first time in the nation’s history 
since independence.  Nor did it regain its control in the 2013 general 
elections.  The ruling coalition not only failed again to secure a two-thirds 
legislative majority but also lost the popular vote to the opposition, although 
the coalition managed to obtain a bare majority of parliamentary seats to 
stay in power. 
For a time, the Malaysian judiciary appeared reinvigorated.  In the 
years following 2008, the Malaysian appellate courts articulated a more 
generous interpretation of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution in 
several bold decisions.  The courts showed a greater willingness to check on 
legislative and executive actions, striking down legislative provisions that 
infringed fundamental liberties. 
More recently, however, the Federal Court and Court of Appeal seem 
to have faltered on the road toward constitutional restoration.  In several 
high profile cases decided in 2015 and 2016, these top appellate courts 
exhibit a retreat to an unduly formalistic and legalistic approach toward 
696 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 3
rights protection, overruling several decisions of the lower High Court that 
manifest a more robust, rights-oriented approach. 
In order to reclaim its constitutional position as a co-equal branch of 
government, the Malaysian judiciary must be willing to uphold its 
constitutional duty to assert its commitment to constitutional supremacy and 
the rule of law.  This remains the case even—or especially—when it appears 
that the powerful political branches are attempting to reject these principles.
To shift the principal constitutional mode in these countries from executive 
dominance to constitutional governance, the courts must play an enhanced 
role in checking the dominance of the political branches.  This 
transformation of judicial culture in turn requires a reorientation of the 
judiciary’s approach toward interpreting the Constitution.  Developing a
constitutional adjudication approach for the Malaysian Constitution in a 
manner true to its core principles and fundamental guarantees would be a 
profoundly significant step for the Malaysian judiciary in its journey toward 
constitutional redemption.
